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26 May 1965

To: DD/S&T

SUBJECT: Advanced Planning Progress Report

1. The current effort to develop a fifteen-year plan is now moving ahead, but with a somewhat less ambitious target date. A skeleton of this plan will be provided to the DCI on Friday, 28 May 1965, and DD/S&T thinking has been reflected throughout in this. What will remain is the problem of filling out this skeleton with special programs, manpower and dollar levels.

2. The present shape of this plan follows the general outline we developed for our own forecasting. It consists of three major sections:

- a. Assumptions about the future
- b. Major intelligence objectives
- c. Programs to meet these objectives.

3. Assumptions about the Future.

Sherman Kent has tried to construct a forecast for the future course of events in the world as they affect the vital interests of the U. S. A one-page summary of his forecast is included here for your information:

ASSUMPTIONS

1966 - 1970

The world will be comprised of a few power centers with a high level of tension.

The real power centers are likely to remain the U. S. and the USSR.

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For the short-term at least, there will be a high degree of tension between the U. S. and CHINA, growing tension between the U. S. and Russia. However, the force of mutual deterrence will make the coming of all-out war between the U. S. and the USSR highly unlikely.

Chinese nuclear capabilities will almost certainly not have grown to the point where the Chinese could contemplate a nuclear attack on the U. S. or its allies.

A substantial non-nuclear armed conflict with China is possible. Should this occur, world tensions would remain high and the risks of general nuclear war by miscalculation would rise appreciably.

ASSUMPTIONS

1971 - 1980

We must assume a growth in the number of power centers. Unless nascent Chinese nuclear capabilities are destroyed in the preceding period, Peiping will be very much in the Big League in Asia and perhaps elsewhere.

The Federal Republic of Germany may have kicked over the traces and gone unclear; France's force de frappe may have become a reality. Other significant power centers may emerge. There may be many power centers and a high order of tension between them, or, less likely, many power centers with a low level of tension.

This will obviously need to be amplified and DDI is now working on this problem.

To such a general statement, we would add the following specific assumptions which have a strong influence on our activities:

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a. The Soviet strategic threat will shift almost completely to hardened missiles. There will be a steady decline in manned bomber forces, and a gradual increase in missile firing submarine capabilities.

b. Soviet space programs will continue to grow, with a trend toward manned orbital and lunar missions. Other nations will enter the space field in a serious way during this period, probably only via unmanned missions. Actual hostilities in space are possible toward the end of this period.

c. The Soviet ABM programs will continue to flourish and expand, posing a real defense to our own offensive capability.

d. A Soviet anti-satellite system will be perfected and used to deny us orbital photography in the next five years, unless suitable counter-measures are taken.

e. Proliferation of modern weapons (nuclear, missiles, bombers, CW and BW) will proceed at an increasing rate, based both on native capabilities and external technological support. Testing of these weapons will be done in many areas but probably not frequently by any one nation.

f. Explosive situations will continue to erupt around the world at a steady and possibly increasing clip, such as Cyprus, South Vietnam, Dominican Republic, Berlin, etc.

g. Serious gaps will open up in the Western Alliance, almost certainly spearheaded by France, but possibly including England and Germany. Intelligence collection in these countries and liaison with the intelligence processing and analytical groups will come under recurring examination.

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h. Communications within and between all countries will increase steadily and perhaps begin to accelerate. Most of the long haul communications will go via earth satellite. Cryptologic protection for diplomatic and military traffic will stay well ahead of cryptographic success in breaking such codes. Our overseas bases for collecting signal intelligence will steadily decrease and large military installations will prove increasingly unwelcome.

i. The flow of all types of information into the intelligence community will accelerate in the same way as worldwide communications do generally.

We have not made assumptions on a number of other key questions which affect the future of intelligence, but feel that we should consider the impact of:

j. US/USSR cooperation in space programs?

k. Tendency toward release of intelligence information for political advantage? (i.e., space failures)

l. Increasing sophistication of foreign intelligence services?

m. Possibility of US/USSR intelligence exchanges or other quite startling rearrangements of the present pattern of intelligence relationships?

Lastly, we are convinced that we cannot and should not preclude:

n. A major technological breakthrough which might have a dramatic effect on the strategic or tactical balance of the major powers.

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Notice that almost none of the above carries a time estimate, and this refinement is one of the tasks before us.

4. Major Intelligence Objectives:

This grouping was termed "planning needs" in our previous discussions, but now relates to a much broader class. The Clarke working group has broken this down into five basic sections:

- a. Intelligence Production
- b. Intelligence Collection
- c. Information Processing & ADP
- d. Covert Action
- e. Program Planning and Support

All of the planning needs we recognized can be fitted into one of these categories. In our sessions, we came up with the following needs:

- a. Continuing photographic surveillance capability for large areas (10 million square miles).
- b. Prompt reconnaissance capability for crisis situations and current intelligence.
- c. Continuing atomic energy detection capability throughout the world.
- d. Strategic missile launch warning capability.
- e. Coordinated collection and analysis capability for monitoring foreign missile and space events, going soon to a real time assessment capability, including "in situ" and "stand-off" inspection systems.

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f. Vastly improved clandestine access to the research and development phases of foreign weapons programs.

g. Reestablish COMINT access to Soviet and Chinese communications.

h. Improve non-Bloc SIGINT.

i. Make a genuine and consistent improvement in the security posture of the U. S. Intelligence Community.

j. Make a significant improvement in the communications systems used to convey intelligence information, all the way from agent access to wide-band relay from overseas stations and collection sites.

k. Establish an intercept and readout capability for monitoring foreign communications passed through earth satellites.

l. Intercept other wideband, line-of-sight communication links (hopefully unencrypted) via satellite, clandestine, or peripheral collection.

m. Creation of uncommitted collection and analytical reserves of all types for use against unexpected developments, viz., flexibility and funding personnel elbow-room.

n. Fuller exploration of technical intelligence collection via artificial stimulation and emphasis on characteristics and performance of foreign devices.

o. Creation of a civilian intercept program for SIGINT in either DOD or CIA.

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p. Fuller exploitation of technical facilities used in U. S. programs for collection and analysis of intelligence data.

q. Remove technical access to high priority areas beyond normal peripheral collection by development and emplacement in situ of transponding technical collection devices.

r. Establish a valid measure of performance for all collection, processing and analysis functions, and compare this continuously with the costs of providing such services.

s. Create a mechanism for approving and rejecting intelligence requirements in relation to the cost of fulfilling them, and judging the programmatic consequences of establishing or abolishing such capabilities.

t. Solve the accelerating processing and analysis overload problem caused by the increasing cascade of raw intelligence data.

u. Improve our capability to recognize and analyze promptly data with priority implications, and to do so within the "delay time" or lifetime of the situation monitored. In our case this refers primarily to prompt processing of technical intelligence data, but it also bears on our efforts to assist other groups in handling their problems.

The above will be blended with and added to other major intelligence objectives, which will be distributed when available.

5. Specific Assignments:

A first cut at sizing the programs needed to meet the above planning needs has been requested in accordance


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f. Processing and Analysis:



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ALBERT D. WHEELON
Deputy Director
for
Science and Technology